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The  magnitude  and  financing  of  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  in  the 
United States, which totaled more than $40 billion in  1987, are potentially 
influenced by  the tax systems of  both the United States and the investor’s 
country. Nevertheless,  all recent studies of  FDI  in the United  States have 
investigated only the effect of U.S. taxation. The home country’s tax system 
has been ignored because either the appropriate data are unavailable or, on 
theoretical grounds, it is deemed to be irrelevant to FDI. 
This paper investigates the effect of both U.S. and home country taxation 
on FDI in the United States. It does this by  first extending and updating the 
standard model of  aggregate FDI in the United States and then disaggregat- 
ing FDI by  the country of  the investing firm so as to facilitate the study of 
home country influences, including taxation. 
The results of  this new empirical approach generally support a negative 
effect of  U.S. effective rates of  taxation on total FDI and new transfers of 
funds, but  not on  retained earnings.  The disaggregated analysis does not, 
though, provide much support for several propositions about the effect on 
FDI in the United States of foreign countries’ tax rates and systems of taxing 
foreign-source income. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  3.1  reviews  the  existing 
empirical literature, and section 3.2 discusses some of  the important issues 
regarding data on FDI in the United States. The next two sections present the 
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results of  the data analyses-in  section 3.3 for aggregate FDI and in section 
3.4 separately for  each  of  seven  major  investing  countries.  Section  3.5 
provides a conclusion. 
3.1  Review of the Existing Empirical Literature 
It  is  generally  accepted  that  FDI  is  primarily  an  issue  of  industrial 
organization. Dunning (1985, 6-7)  has argued that FDI by firms of country 
A  in country B  is  more likely if  A’s  firms (i) possess ownership-specific 
advantages relative to B’s firms in sourcing markets, (ii) find it profitable to 
use these advantages themselves rather than lease them to B’s firms, and (iii) 
find  it profitable to utilize their ownership-specific advantages in B rather 
than A. A large body of  empirical literature has been addressed to testing 
this theory of  international production, usually referred to as the “eclectic” 
theory. Much of this research has been cross-sectional, relating the extent of 
foreign investment in  a  given  sector to  characteristics of  that  sector that 
represent ownership-specific and location-specific comparative advantages. 
Several examples of this type of analysis are contained in Dunning (1985). 
Studies  of  the  effects  of  taxation  on  FDI  have  generally  taken  the 
perspective that,  whatever its benefits to firms are, they must be balanced 
against the tax consequences of  carrying out FDI. The tax systems of  both 
the firm’s home country and potential host countries can affect the incentives 
concerning FDI as well as how to finance a given pattern of FDI. Theoretical 
treatments of these questions are presented in Alworth (1988) and Gersovitz 
(1987).  The  limited empirical  literature  on  the  effect  of  taxes  on  multi- 
nationals’ behavior is summarized in Caves (1982). 
Empirical study focusing on the effect of  taxation on the time series of 
FDI in the United States was pioneered by  Hartman (1984). Using annual 
data from  1965 to  1979, he estimated the response of  FDI,  separately for 
investment financed by retained earnings and transfers from abroad, to three 
variables: the  after-tax rate  of  return realized by  foreign investors in  the 
United  States, the  overall after-tax rate of  return  on  capital in  the United 
States, and the tax rate on U.S. capital owned by  foreigners relative to the 
tax rate on U.S. capital owned by  U.S.  investors. The first two terms are 
meant to proxy for the prospective return to new FDI, the first term being 
more appropriate for firms considering expansion of  current operations and 
the second more applicable to the acquisition of existing assets that are not 
expected to earn extraordinary returns based on production of differentiated 
products  or  possession  of  superior  technology.  The  relative  tax  term  is 
designed to capture the possibility that tax changes that apply only to U. S . 
investors  will,  by  affecting  the  valuation  of  assets,  alter  the  foreign 
investor’s cost and therefore the return to acquiring the asset. 
Hartman does not attempt to measure either an effective withholding tax 
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defends their absence by  noting the likelihood that  the average values of 
these tax rates are relatively constant over time. Furthermore, no attempt is 
made to measure the alternative rate of  return available abroad to foreign 
investors. 
Hartman’s regression results reveal both a positive association of after-tax 
rate  of  return variables with  the  ratio  to  U.S. GNP of  FDI  financed by 
retained earnings and a negative association of the FDI-GNP ratio with the 
relative tax rate on foreigners compared to domestic residents. The model 
does not explain transfers from abroad as well as retained earnings, although 
coefficients of all three variables have the expected sign and are significantly 
different from zero. From this research, Hartman concludes that the effect of 
taxes  on  €31, both  that  implied  by  reinvestment  of  earnings  and  that 
accomplished by  explicit transfer of funds, is quite strong. 
Boskin and Gale (1987) reestimate Hartman’s equation using the updated 
tax rate and rate of return series from Feldstein and Jun (1987). Although the 
estimated elasticities of FDI to the rates of return are somewhat lower, none 
of  the point estimates changes by  more than one standard deviation. They 
also extend the sample forward to  1984, and  in  some cases backward to 
1956, and experiment with a variety of alternative explanatory variables and 
functional forms.  They  conclude that,  although the results are  somewhat 
sensitive to sample period  and specification, the qualitative conclusions of 
Hartman are fairly robust. 
Young  (1988) uses revised data on investment, GNP,  and rates of return 
earned by  foreigners to estimate similar equations. These changes increase 
the  estimated  elasticities  with  respect  to  the  rate  of  return  realized  by 
foreigners and the relative rate of  return.  However, the equations for new 
transfers of funds estimated using the years 1956-84  yield very poor results, 
suggesting  to  Young  that  the  simple  Hartman  model  is  inadequate  for 
studying foreign direct investment through new  funds when applied to the 
expanded  sample  period.  Relaxing  Hartman’s  assumption  of  a  unitary 
income  elasticity  and  including  the  lagged  dependent  variable  as  a 
right-hand-side  variable  does  not  substantially  alter  the  conclusions  for 
retained  earnings  (although  the  estimated  responsiveness  is  significantly 
lower),  but  the  tax  responsiveness of  transfer  of  new  funds  still  is  not 
supported. 
Newlon  (1987) reexamines the results of  Hartman  as well  as those  of 
Boskin and Gale. During his attempt at replication, he discovered that the 
series measuring the rate of return on FDI, used in all earlier papers, had 
been miscalculated from the original Bureau of  Economic Analysis data for 
the  years  1965-73.  Using  the  corrected  series,  the  equation  explaining 
retained  earnings  does  not  fit  as  well,  although the  equation  explaining 
transfers fits  better.  In  explaining retained earnings,  the  estimated coeffi- 
cients on the return to FDI and the tax ratio are slightly larger in absolute 
value and remain statistically significant, although the estimated coefficient 82  Joel Slemrod 
on the net return  in the United  States is lower and is no longer statistically 
significant.  For transfers  of  funds, the estimated coefficient on the return to 
FDI  is  much  larger  and  becomes  significant,  although  the  estimated 
coefficient  on  the  net  return  in  the  United  States  becomes  smaller  and 
insignificant.  When  the  sample  period  is extended  to range  from  1956 to 
1984, Newlon’s  results  also  differ  from those  of  Hartman  and  those  of 
Boskin and Gale. In particular, the equation explaining transfer of funds fits 
poorly, and no estimated coefficient is significant.2 
It  is notable  that  none  of  these  studies  has  deviated  very  far from the 
approach taken in Hartman’s (1984) paper. Although Young (1988) refers to 
Feldstein’s (1982) dictum that, in the absence of a perfectly specified model, 
many  alternative models should be investigated,  the empirical research has 
been extremely one tracked. This is a sufficient reason to explore alternative 
methodologies.  Furthermore, there  are several problems  with the  standard 
approach that bear further study. 
In the previous literature, the disincentive to investment caused by the tax 
system is implicitly measured by an average tax rate, computed as total taxes 
paid  divided by  a measure  of  profits. However,  the incentive to undertake 
new investment depends on the effective marginal tax rate, which, as is well 
known. can deviate substantially from an average tax rate concept. 
None of the  existing studies attempts to estimate  the effect of the home 
country’s tax system on FDI in the United States. Of course, collecting the 
appropriate data is difficult, and perhaps, as Hartman argued, these tax rates 
have  not  in  fact  varied  much.  The observed  stability,  though,  applies  to 
statutory  tax  rates  and  not  necessarily  to  the  more  appropriate  effective 
marginal tax rates. There is also a theoretical reason to focus attention on the 
host country tax rate. Hartman (1985) has argued that only the host country’s 
tax system matters for investment coming from subsidiaries’ earnings,  even 
when the home country taxes its residents on the basis of worldwide iw~me. 
This is because the home country’s tax equally reduces the parent’s return to 
an investment and the opportunity cost of making an investment (remitting a 
dividend to the ~arent).~  Thus, for any subsidiary whose desired investment 
exceeds earnings,  the tax due on repatriation of earnings does matter. This 
situation would likely occur for newly formed subsidiaries. In any event, it is 
worthwhile to investigate empirically the effect of both the home country’s 
rate of taxation and its system of taxing foreign-source income. 
’fie  interpretation of the estimated coefficient on the rate of return to FDI 
variable  is also problematic,  as stressed by Newlon.  This rate of return is 
defined as the after-tax income from direct investment divided by the stock 
of direct investment.  When the home country has a foreign tax credit with 
deferral,  it is often optimal for the subsidiary to finance investment first by 
using retained earnings and then, only when these earnings are exhausted, by 
using  funds transferred  from the  parent  firm.  This hierarchy  of  financing 
implies  that,  whenever  a  subsidiary’s  investment  exceeds  its  retained 83  Tax Effects on FDI in the U.S. 
earnings, its retained earnings will exactly equal its income. Thus, for these 
firms, we  would expect a direct association between the calculated rate of 
return  (in  which  after-tax income is  the numerator) on  FDI  and  retained 
earnings, regardless of  whether the average rate of  return in fact influences 
decisions  concerning  new  FDI.  As  Newlon  notes,  if  subsidiaries  were 
following a fixed dividend payout rule (e.g., it pays out a fixed fraction of 
income), a direct association between income and retained earnings would 
also be  observed.  This  argument may  also apply  to  subsidiaries of  firms 
residing  in  countries  that  employ  temtorial  systems  of  taxation,  thus 
rendering problematic any observed empirical association between FDI out 
of  retained earnings and realized rate of  return. 
3.2  Data Issues 
3.2.1  Definition of  FDI 
FDI, as measured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), consists of 
earnings  retained  by  subsidiaries  and  branches  of  foreign  parents  and 
transfers of  funds from the foreign parents to the U.S. firms, including both 
debt and equity transfers.  Thus,  FDI does not correspond directly to  any 
measure  of  real  investment,  as  it  excludes investment financed by  funds 
raised locally (or in third countries) by the U.S. firm and includes purchases 
of existing assets by foreigners. It is more accurately thought of as a measure 
of financial flows rather than of real investment. Unfortunately, no data exist 
on real investment made by foreign branches and subsidiaries. Note also that 
the data do not distinguish between branches and subsidiaries, even though 
in  general  the  tax  treatment  by  the  home  country  of  the  two  forms  of 
organization is different. Finally, only in this decade has the data on transfers 
of  funds  been  disaggregated  into  debt  and  equity  transfers,  rendering 
multivariate analysis impossible at this time. 
3.2.2  Drift from Benchmark Years 
The data on FDI in the United States is based on benchmark surveys conducted 
by the BEA in 1959, 1974, and 1980. For nonbenchmark years, estimates for all 
series except  equity  and  intercompany account  inflows were  constructed by 
extrapolating the benchmark data based on sample data from quarterly surveys. 
The 1959 benchmark data were extrapolated backward to construct estimates for 
1950-58 and were extrapolated forward to construct estimates for 1960-73. The 
1974 benchmark data were used to derive estimates for 1974-79, and the 1980 
benchmark data were used for estimates of  1980 and thereafter. Reported equity 
and intercompany account flows are taken directly from the quarterly sample with 
extrapolation, owing to the unreliable relation between the reported and the 
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Note that, except for 1959, the benchmark data are not used to revise the 
data based on the quarterly survey for earlier years. This procedure gives rise 
to the suspicion that data for nonbenchmark years misestimate true FDI. This 
suspicion has  been  confirmed  for  1974 because  the  BEA  has  compared 
estimates based on the  1974 benchmark survey with estimates based on an 
extrapolation from the  1959 benchmark.  For  equity and  intercompany ac- 
count  flows,  the  extrapolated  total  is  $2.50  billion  compared  to  $3.70 
billion from the 1974 benchmark, an underestimate of  more than one-third. 
In contrast, for reinvested earnings the extrapolated figure is $1.13 billion, 
actually higher than the benchmark figure of $1.07 billion. The discrepancy 
between  the  two  estimates  varies  widely  by  country  and  by  industry, 
however. 
Other important changes in concept and definition were introduced with 
the  1974  benchmark  survey.  The  minimum  ownership  criterion  in  the 
definition of FDI was decreased from 25 to 10 percent, a change that in 1974 
accounted  for  $1.2 billion  of  the  $25.1 billion  total  FDI  position in  the 
United  States.  Also  in  1974  began  major  changes  in  the  treatment  of 
unrealized  capital  gains  and  losses,  the  classification  of  incorporated 
insurance affiliates,  and  the  coverage  of  reverse  equity  ownership  (U.S. 
affiliates’ equity  ownership  in  their  foreign  parents).  Finally,  starting  in 
1974, FDI was classified by the country of foreign parent-the  first foreign 
person in  the ownership chain of  the U.S. affiliate. Before  1974, estimates 
for some affiliates were classified by the “ultimate beneficial owner,”  which 
is the person in the ownership chain, beginning with the foreign parent, that 
is  not  owned  more  than  50  percent  by  another person.  This  change  in 
classification apparently affected several large affiliates, with the result that 
the geographic distribution of the estimates was significantly affected. 
Some of  the earlier studies of  FDI ignored these data definition issues, 
while others included a dummy variable to differentiate pre- and postbench- 
mark periods. However, none of the studies directly addressed the apparent 
problem  that,  the  further  away  from  a  benchmark  year,  the  greater  the 
survey-based numbers misreport actual FDI. To account for this tendency, in 
much of what follows I utilize a dummy variable whose value is the difference 
between the data year and the benchmark year from which the reported data 
are estimated. Thus, this variable has a value of zero in the benchmark years 
1959, 1974, and 1980 and a positive value in all other years since 1960 (when 
the benchmark data are extrapolated forward). It takes on a maximum value 
of fourteen in 1973, when the benchmark data are extrapolated fourteen years 
forward.  This  procedure  allows  for  a  constant  amount  of  drift  between 
benchmarks of  the  reported  FDI  data.  In  addition,  I  consider  a  dummy 
variable for the period beginning in 1974 to account for the one-time changes 
in concepts, definitions, and classification of FDI by country that occurred in 
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3.3  Total FDI in  the United States 
3.3.1  Trends 
Figure 3.1 shows the behavior of FDI in the United States, as a ratio to 
U.S. GNP, for the period 1953-87.  It also breaks this ratio down into two 
components-retained  earnings and new transfers of funds, both as a ratio to 
U.S. GNP. 
As figure 3.1 shows, the ratio of  FDI to GNP shows no clear trend until 
approximately 1972, when it began to grow quickly. By 1974, FDI amounted 
to 0.32 percent of  GNP,  or more than  four times  as high  as the average 
percentage in the two decades from 1953  to 1972. A second surge of FDI  began 
in  1978, pushing the ratio to a record 0.83 percent in  1981 and an average of 
0.48 percent from 1982  to 1984, or five times higher than the 1953-72 average 
and two and a half  times the 1977 ratio. In  1987, FDI in the United States 
totaled nearly $42.0 billion, or 0.94 percent of the GNP of $4.49 trillion. Both 
the total FDI and the ratio to GNP in 1987 were all-time highs. 
One striking aspect of  FDI is the decline within the  last decade in  the 
relative importance of retained earnings compared to new transfers of funds. 
Through  1980, retained earnings represented a large, stable component of 
total FDI, composing 37.0 percent of  the total. In  1977, the contribution of 
retained earnings relative to new transfers began to fall, and, by  1981, it 
began to decline in absolute terms as well. In the period 1981-87,  retained 
earnings composed only 1.4 percent of  total FDI. 
Is  the rapid  growth of  FDI  in  the  United  States since  1972 part  of  a 
worldwide trend, or does it instead represent a relative shift of  FDI to the 
United States from other locations? Figures 3.2 and  3.3 help answer that 
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FDI in the United States as a fraction of worldwide FDI of seven 
question.  Figure  3.2 shows  that  outward  FDI from  seven  major  investing 
nations to countries other than the United States was flat until  1969, when a 
large boom  lasting  until  1973 occurred, followed  by  relative  stability and 
another  surge  from  1978 through  1981.4 According  to figure  3.3, FDI in 
the  United  States  as  a  fraction  of  the  seven  countries’  worldwide  FDI 
reached 40.5 percent in 1969, fell sharply until  1971, and then rose steadily 
until an all-time high of 43.7 percent was reached in  1981. It has remained 
at  a  high  level  since  then.  Apparently,  the  strong  growth  of  FDI in  the 
United  States  starting in  1972  does  indeed  represent  an  increase  in  the 
relative strength of  the United  States as a location of FDI. 87  Tax Effects on FDI  in the U.S. 
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Note:  Dependent  variable  is  the  logarithm  of  [(lo00 X  REIGNP)  +  1.231.  Column  1 
corresponds  to  eq.  2  of  table  II.2b  in  Newlon  (1987).  All  independent  variables  are  in 
logarithms.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
3.3.2  Analysis 
Replication of  Earlier Findings 
As is ritual in this literature, I begin the analysis by trying to reproduce the 
aggregate time-series results of  a predecessor in the literature, in this case 
Newlon (1987). In a break from precedent, I am able to reproduce his main 
results  to  three  significant  digits.  These  results  are  reported  in  the  first 
column of  tables 3.1 and 3.2. As discussed in section 3.1,  they suggest a 
strong positive  association between  the  after-tax return on  FDI-denoted 
r(l - t)-and  FDI financed by retained earnings, but not for new transfers 
of funds. The relative tax rate-denoted  (1 - t')/(l  - t)-variable  and the 
overall  rate  of  return-denoted  r'(1 - t)-have  no  significant  effect  on 
either component of FDI.' 
Because of  my uneasiness about the economic implications of a statistical 
association  between  the  components  of  FDI  and  the  measured  average 
after-tax of  return to capital, I next separate out as explanatory variables the 
average pretax rate of return earned by  foreigners (r),  the average pretax rate 
of  return earned on all capital in the United States (r'),  and the two average 88  Joel Slemrod 
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Note:  Dependent  variable  is  the  logarithm  of  [(lo00 x  TWGNP) + 1.6761.  Column  1 
corresponds  to  eq.  4  of  table  II.2b  in  Newlon  (1987).  All  independent  variables  are  in 
logarithms. Standard errors in parentheses. 
tax  rate  terms  (t  for  the  tax  rate  on  foreigners,  t'  for  the  total  tax  rate 
including taxes paid by  U.S.  residents at the personal  level).6 The results 
are reported in the second column of  tables 3.1 and 3.2. While the pretax 
return  to  FDI retains  a  positive  association  with  the  ratio  of  retained 
earnings  to  GNP,  neither  tax  term  is  significantly different  than  zero. 
However,  this  is  not  the  case  for  transfers  of  funds.  In  this  case,  the 
average  tax  rate  faced  by  foreigners  does  have  a  statistically significant 
negative coefficient, and, as suggested by the theory, the total tax rate faced 
by a U.S.  investor has a positive coefficient. 
Note  that  these  results  concerning  the  tax  rate  variables  reverse  the 
conclusions of Hartman (1984), who concluded that the behavior of retained 
earnings was consistent with expectations but that the estimated response of 
transfers of  new funds did not conform to expectations. I attribute his first 
finding to the inevitable relation between retained earnings and a measure of 
rate of return whose numerator is highly correlated with retained earnings. 
I next replace the two measures of  average tax rate by a measure of  the 
marginal effective corporate tax rate on fixed investment (7)  in the United 89  Tax  Effects on FDI in the U.S. 
States, as calculated by Auerbach and Hines (1988). This is arguably a better 
measure of the expected tax burden on a prospective new investment. These 
results, shown in  column 3 of  tables  3.1  and  3.2, suggest that the U.S. 
marginal tax rate has had a significant effect on transfer of funds but not on 
retained   earning^.^  The  coefficient on  the  tax  rate  corresponds to  a  tax 
elasticity of  transfers of -  1.40, when evaluated at the average transfers to 
GNP ratio over the period.8 
None of the previous work reports the results of equations explaining total 
FDI  in  the  United  States; rather,  it  considers only  its  component parts 
(retained earnings and  transfer of  funds). Table 3.3 reports the results of 
repeating the regressions of  tables 3.1 and 3.2 for total FDI. These results 
strongly support the negative association of  total FDI with U.S.  taxation. 
The elasticity of  response is -  1.16, slightly less than  that estimated for 
transfers alone. 
In  column 4  of  tables  3.1-3.3,  I  present  the  results  of  the  simplest 
possible formulation of this model, with only the effective marginal tax rate 
on new investment included as an explanatory variable. The principal reason 
for eliminating the  rate  of  return  variables is to investigate whether the 
estimated  negative  tax  effect  may  be  related  to  the  definitional relation 
Table 3.3  Regression Results for Total FDI, 1956-84 
Independent Variables 
7  -  1.161  -  1.281 
t  -5.646 
(1.696) 
t’  4.476 
(2.332) 
r  ,641  1.082 
(.294)  (  ,266) 
r1  -  1.632  -2.666 
( ,843)  (49) 
r(l - t)  ,278 
(.498) 
-  .477 
(1.024) 
(1 - t1)/(1 - t)  -  2.157 
(1.396) 
Intercept  -  1.215  -  4.079  -4.18  -  .978 
(2.712)  (1.603)  (1.198)  (.367) 
Durbin-Watson statistic  .46  1.67  1.80  .60 
R2  ,183  .772  .765  .332 
Note: Dependent variable is the logarithm of  (lo00 X  FDVGNP). All independent variables are 
in logarithms.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
(.240)  (.326) 
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between  the  dependent  variable  and  these  measures.  The  results  do  not 
indicate  that  this  problem  is  a  real  one.  The  tax  variable  still  has  no 
significant association with retained earnings, but it does have a statistically 
significant negative association with transfers and total FDI. 
New Specifications 
In this  section, the robustness of  the finding that  both  new  transfers of 
funds and total FDI, but not retained earnings, have a significant negative 
association with the effective rate of U.S. capital income taxation is tested 
against the kinds of  specification changes suggested earlier. These changes 
are discussed below. 
Linear  Specification.  The simple association between either total  FDI or 
transfers  and  the  effective  tax  rate  survives  the  replacement  of  the 
logarithmic specification with a linear one. For both transfers and total FDI, 
the  estimated tax  rate  coefficient implies an  elasticity  similar to  what  is 
obtained in  the  logarithmic specification; in  both cases,  the  estimated tax 
coefficient  is  insignificantly  different  from  zero  in  explaining  retained 
earnings. 
Although there is no theoretical reason for prefemng one specification to 
the  other,  because  of  the  presence  of  negative  dependent  variables  the 
logarithmic specification necessitates the addition to the unlogged value of 
an  arbitrary  constant.  This procedure clouds the comparison of  estimated 
coefficients across equations, which becomes important below when home 
country disaggregation is done. 
Including Other  Explanatory  Variables.  The  vector  of  explanatory vari- 
ables  is  expanded  to  consider  potential  nontax  influences  on  FDI.  In 
particular, I include the f~llowing.~ 
RGDP: the ratio of  total GDP of  the seven major investing countries to 
U.S.  GDP,  where  the  foreign GDPs  are  valued  at  the  purchasing power 
parity  exchange  rates  calculated  by  Summers  and  Heston  (1988).  This 
variable is meant to capture the effect of  the changing relative size of  the 
principal investing countries compared to the United States. 
USUNEMP:  the  unemployment rate  of  prime-age males in  the  United 
States. This variable is meant to capture potential business cycle effects on 
FDI. 
REXC: the real exchange rate of  the U.S. dollar against a GDP weighted 
average  of  the  seven  major  investing  countries’  currencies.  Dunning 
(1985)  and  Pugel  (1985)  have  suggested  that  a  low  dollar  reduces 
comparative  production  costs  in  the  United  States,  thus  providing  an 
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DRIFT: a dummy variable equal to the number of years elapsed since the 
previous benchmark survey of FDI conducted by  the BEA. lo 
Lagged Tax  Rate Terms.  Because of the time it takes to implement an in- 
vestment decision, there may be a lag between changes in the effective tax rate 
and the effect on FDI. To allow for this possibility, not only the concurrent tax 
rate but  also the tax  rate  lagged one year  and two  years  are included as 
explanatory variables.  l1  This procedure limits the length of the lag but imposes 
no structure on the time pattern of  the lagged response of investment. 
The  results  of  estimating  this  specification  are  presented  in  the  first 
column  of  table  3.4.  Of  the  nontax  explanatory variables,  the  estimated 
coefficients on USUNEMP, RGDP, and DRIFT are not significantly different 
than zero. The estimated coefficient on the real rate of  exchange variable, 
Table 3.4  Further Regression Results for FDI 
Sample Period and Dependent Variable 
1960- 87,  1969- 87,  1960- 87,  1960-87,  1960- 87, 
Independent Variables  FDUGNP  FDUGNP  RE/GNP  TWGNP  FDIMF/GNP 
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REXC, is negative and significant, suggesting that a low dollar may in fact 
have  stimulated FDI  in  the  United  States.’* Though  not  significant, the 
DRIFT parameter has the expected negative sign, suggesting that FDI may 
be  increasingly  underestimated  as  the  time  elapsed  since  the  previous 
benchmark survey increases. 
Of  the tax  rate  variables,  both  the  current value  and the  value lagged 
two  years  have  a  significant  negative  coefficient.  There  is  substantial 
multicollinearity among the three tax variables, however. The t-statistic on 
the  estimated  sum  of  -13.3  of  the  three  tax  coefficients  is  -3.67, 
indicating that it is different than zero at a 95 percent level of  confidence. 
The  tax  rate  elasticity is -  1.57 when  evaluated at  mean  values  for the 
entire period. 
That  this result is not  robust  to  all reasonable  specification changes is 
suggested by the results shown in the second column of  table 3.4. When a 
weighted  average of  the  seven investing countries’ unemployment rate  is 
included (denoted FUNEMP), it is highly positively related to FDI, and the 
tax coefficients now sum to a positive rather than a negative number.I3 Thus, 
a competing alternative explanation for the time series of FDI is that it has 
been propelled by deteriorating economic conditions in the home countries.  l4 
In order to  focus on the possible tax  influences on FDI, the analyses that 
follow do not include the foreign unemployment rate variable. 
The  third  and  fourth  columns  of  table  3.4  display  the  results  of 
disaggregating FDI into retained earnings (RE) and transfers of funds (TR). 
The conclusion drawn from tables 3.1 and 3.2 still holds-that  transfers are 
associated with taxes negatively but that for retained earnings no  negative 
association is apparent.I5 Finally, in the equation shown in the fifth column 
of  table  3.4,  the dependent variable is FDI  from manufacturing for four 
countries-Canada,  Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The 
negative association with U.S.  effective tax rates is still evident, although 
the estimated elasticity of  response is about three-fifths of  what it was for 
total FDI. 
3.4  FDI in the United States by Investing Country 
3.4.1  Motivation and Theory of Cross-country Comparisons 
Most  countries choose one of  two basic  options for taxing the income 
earned  abroad  by  its  domestic  residents.  Under  a  residence-based  (or 
‘‘worldwide”) system, the capital-exporting country taxes its residents’ in- 
come wherever it is earned. To  avoid double taxation, these countries as a 
rule  allow  their  residents  (individuals and  corporations) to  credit  foreign 
taxes paid against the domestic tax owed on the foreign income. The credit is 
limited to the tax due under the home country’s tax rules. Any home country 
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termed  the  “repatriation  tax,”  is  generally  deferred  until  dividends are 
remitted  to  the parent  company. Under a  source-based (also known  as  a 
‘‘territorial”  or  ‘‘exemption”)  system,  foreign-source income  is  exempt 
from home country taxation. Furthermore, no credit is given for taxes paid 
to foreign governments. Which principle applies for a given country may 
depend  on  the  form  that  the  investment  income  takes  (e.g.,  dividend, 
interest,  capital  gains),  the  location  of  the  investment  (e.g.,  treaty  vs. 
nontreaty countries), and the extent of  ownership and control exercised by 
the domestic owner. 
The effect of  a host country’s tax structure on inward foreign investment 
depends on  the tax  system of  the capital-exporting country. For example, 
when  the  country  of  capital  export  has  an  exemption  tax  system,  the 
effective corporate-level rate of  tax on FDI is equal to the tax rate imposed 
by the host country. Therefore, differences among host country effective tax 
rates  would  be  expected  to  have  an  effect  on  the  location  decision  of 
investment  from  exemption countries.  The  effect  of  differences  in  host 
countries’ tax structures would be expected to have less influence on foreign 
investment from countries that have worldwide tax  systems with a foreign 
tax credit. In  a simple case without deferral, unless the host country’s tax 
rate is higher than the home country’s tax rate, the effective tax rate on FDI 
becomes  the  home  country’s,  regardless of  the  tax  system  of  the  host 
country. The effective tax rate is more complicated when there is deferral, 
multicountry  investment,  and  differing definitions  of  taxable  income  in 
different  countries.  Nevertheless,  for  firms  based  in  foreign  tax  credit 
countries, the effect of  the host country’s tax system is filtered through the 
tax system of the home country and may be substantially mitigated. 
Of  the major countries that make FDI in the United States, some operate 
exemption systems, while others operate a worldwide system with foreign 
tax credit. This fortuitous divergence of approach invites an investigation of 
whether  the  system  of  taxing  foreign-source income  is  a  factor  in  the 
responsiveness of FDI to host and home country taxation. In what follows, I 
examine the time series of  FDI in the United States emanating from seven 
countries  and  investigate whether  these  time  series  are  consistent  with 
several propositions about the effect on  FDI of  tax  rates and  systems of 
taxing foreign-source income. 
3.4.2  Trends 
Figures 3.4a-3.10a  and  3.4b-3.10b  present  the time series of  FDI for 
each of  seven major investing countries, in  3.4a-3.10a  as a ratio of U.S. 
GNP and in 3.4b-3.10b  as a ratio of total FDI in the United States by these 
seven countries. The figures generally show rapid growth in FDI beginning 
in  the early  1970s. They also show the rise in the relative prominence of 
Japan,  whose FDI  was  negligible  in  the  1960s but  by  1985 represented 
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of FDI from Canada,  which in the  1960s represented  about  30 percent  of 
FDI in the United States but by  the 1980s composed significantly less than 
10 percent of  total FDI. The largest investors for most of  this period have 
been Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, challenged in the 
1980s by Japan. 
Another message that the figures convey is that FDI, while generally (i.e., 
except for Canada and Italy) growing as a fraction of  U.S. GNP since the 
early  1970s, has followed somewhat different paths in the seven countries. 
Therefore, no single story is likely to be sufficient to explain the behavior of 
FDI from each of  these countries. 
3.4.3  Analysis 
As discussed in section 3.4.1, analysis of the FDI data disaggregated by 
the residence of the investing firms can shed further light on the effect of the 99  Tax  Effects on FDI  in the U.S 
host and home countries’ tax systems on the magnitude and location of  FDJ. 
Two empirical strategies are followed. In the first, separate FDI equations 
similar to  those  of  table  3.4 are  estimated for  each  of  the  seven  major 
investing countries. The differences in  responsiveness in  taxation are then 
related  to  the  investing  country’s  system  of  taxing  foreign  income.  In 
particular, the response of countries with exemption systems is compared to 
countries with worldwide tax systems and a foreign tax credit. In the second 
approach, country-specific FDI equations are estimated utilizing time-series 
data on the statutory corporate tax rates and the effective tax rates on new 
investment in the home country. These results are then examined for insights 
into several propositions relating to the effect of taxes on FDI. 
Tables  3.5-3.7  present the  first  set of  results for country-specific  FDI 
regressions. Ordinary least squares (OLS) is used  in  each case.I6 Table 3.5 
contains the  equations for retained  earnings,  table  3.6 contains equations 
explaining transfer of funds, and table 3.7 is concerned with total FDI, each 
expressed  as  a  ratio  to  U.S.  GNP.  The  explanatory  variables  used  are 
identical to those used in the equations of  table 3.4, except that the overall 
GDP ratio and overall real exchange rate are replaced by  country-specific 
variables. 
The countries are grouped by their system of  taxing income from FDI in 
the United  States.  In  the first group are countries that  effectively exempt 
such income from domestic taxation-Canada,  France, the Netherlands, and 
West Germany.  l7  For these countries’ firms, it is the U.S. tax rate, unfiltered 
by  home  country tax  rules,  that  affects  the  attractiveness of  FDI  in  the 
United States compared to alternative investment locations and compared to 
no investment at all. 
The second group of  countries-Italy,  Japan, and the United Kingdom- 
operate a foreign tax credit system with deferral for subsidiaries. U.S. tax 
is due on the income as earned.  When income is repatriated to the home 
country, the grossed-up earnings are subject to home country taxation, but 
taxes  paid  to  the  U.S.  government  are  credited  against  tax  liability,  as 
long  as  this  liability does  not  exceed  the  home  country  liability on  this 
income. 
What the effective total tax rate on investment is in this situation has been 
the subject of  some controversy. In the absence of  deferral (and assuming 
that  both  home  and host  country use  the  same definition of  income), the 
home country tax rate applies unless the host country tax rate exceeds the 
home  country  rate,  in  which  case  the  host  country  rate  applies.  With 
deferral,  Hartman (1985) has  argued that  the  host country tax  rate  is the 
effective tax rate on investments that are financed by  retained earnings, and 
the  above reasoning  applies to  investments financed by  new  transfers of 
funds. 
This brief look at received wisdom suggests the following propositions. 
1. FDI from exemption countries should be at least as sensitive to U.S. tax 
rates as FDI from foreign tax credit countries. Table 3.5  Regression Equations Explaining Retained Earnings, by  Investing Country 
Country and Sample Period 
“Exemption”  Countries  Foreign Tax  Credit Countries 
Canada,  France,  Netherlands,  West Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  United Kingdom, 
Independent Variables  1960-87  1962-87  1960-87  1962-87  1962-87  1960-87  1960-87 
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Note:  See notes to table 3.4. Table 3.6  Regression Equations Explaining Transfers of Funds, by Investing Country 
Country and Sample Period 
“Exemption”  Countries  Foreign Tax Credit Countries 
Canada,  France,  Netherlands,  West Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  United Kingdom, 
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Nore: See notes to table 3.4. Table 3.7  Regression Equations Explaining Total FDI, by  Investing Country 
Country and Sample Period 
“Exemption”  Countries  Foreign Tax Credit Countries 
Canada,  France,  Netherlands,  West Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  United Kingdom, 
1962-87  1960-87  1960-87  1962-87  1960-87  1962-87  Independent Variables  1960- 87 
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2. The greater sensitivity of  FDI from exemption  countries for U.S. tax 
rates should be most apparent in the behavior of new transfers of  funds. 
The results shown in table 3.6 offer strong corroboration for the negative 
association  of  U.S. tax  rates  and  FDI financed  by  transfers of  funds. The 
summed tax coefficient  is negative for all seven countries and  significantly 
different  from  zero  in  four  of  these  cases.  The  estimated  tax  effect  on 
retained  earnings,  shown  in table  3.5, ranges  from significant  positive  to 
significant negative,  with no clear trend emerging.  For total FDI (shown in 
table 3.7), the tax effect is significantly negative for four of seven countries. 
The tax effect in these four countries sums to more than the tax effect shown 
in the first column of table 3.4. 
The regression analyses do not support propositions 1 and 2 strongly. The 
four countries that have a significant tax effect on transfers and total FDI are 
evenly  divided  between  exemption  countries  (Netherlands  and  West 
Germany) and foreign tax credit countries (Japan and the United Kingdom). 
The  association  of  tax  rates  with  retained  earnings  also has  no  obvious 
pattern according to the tax system. 
Table 3.8 displays the results of repeating the regressions explaining total 
FDI for manufacturing  investment  only.  These data  are fully  available for 
only four of the seven countries-Canada,  Japan, the Netherlands,  and the 
United Kingdom. The summed tax effect for Japan and the United Kingdom 
remains negative and significantly different from zero. The magnitude of the 
estimated  effect  shrinks  substantially  in  the  case  of  Japan,  reducing  the 
elasticity  from  -2.90  to  -2.25.  The estimated  elasticity  for  the  United 
Kingdom  stays  about  the  same  as  for  total  FDI.  For  Canada  and  the 
Netherlands,  the  summed  tax  effect  is,  as  for  total  FDI,  not  significantly 
different from zero. 
3.4.4  The Effect of Home Country Taxation on FDI in the United States 
The rate of home country taxation may influence FDI in the United States 
through  at least two different avenues. First, it affects the after-tax return to 
investment in the home country, which is presumably an alternative to FDI. 
For this reason, we would expect the home country tax rate to be positively 
associated with FDI in the United States. 
A second avenue of influence applies only to home countries that operate a 
foreign tax  credit system, not countries  that operate  an exemption  system. 
Ignoring  deferral,  and  assuming  that  the  multinational  operates  only  in at 
most  the  home  country  and  the  United  States, the  effective  tax  rate  on 
income from FDI is the  maximum  of  the  U.S. rate and the home country 
rate.18 When the home country rate exceeds the U.S. rate, it is the effective 
tax rate on both home country investment and FDI, and so its level does not 
affect the relative after-tax returns of  the alternative investments, although it 
does  depress  the  return  of  all  investment  alternatives.  In  a  more  general 
situation,  when  there  is  deferral  and  multicountry  operation,  the  home 104  Joel Slemrod 
Table 3.8  Regression Equations Explaining Total FDI in Manufacturing, by 
Investing Country 
Country and Sample Period 
“Exemption”  Countries 
Canada,  Netherlands,  Japan,  United Kingdom, 
Foreign Tax  Credit Countries 
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country tax rate will increase the effective tax rate on FDI, though by  less 
than  it  increases  the  tax rate  on investment  in the home  country.  Recall, 
however,  Hartman’s  demonstration  that,  for  investment  out  of  retained 
earnings, only the host country’s tax rate is relevant. 
This review of the effects of  home country taxation on FDI suggests the 
following propositions. 
3.  FDI from exemption countries should be positively related to the rate of 
home country taxation. 
4. FDI financed by new transfers of funds from foreign tax credit countries 
should  have  a  less  clearly  positive,  or  even  negative,  relation  to  home 
country taxation. 
5.  Retained  earnings  from  foreign  tax  credit  countries  should  be 
unaffected by, or positively related to, home country taxation. 
Statutory  tax  rates  have  an  influence  on  multinationals’  decisions, 
independent  of  their  effect  operating  through  the  effective  tax  rates  on 
investment. A  multinational  has  an  incentive  to do its  borrowing  through 105  Tax  Effects on FDI in the U.S. 
firms operating in  a country with  relatively high  statutory rates,  so as to 
maximize the tax  benefits of  the interest deductions. This would imply  a 
negative  relation  between  the  volume  of  transfers  and  the  difference 
between  the  U.S.  statutory rate  and  the  home  country  statutory rate.  A 
multinational  also  has  an  incentive to  set  transfer  prices  so  as  to  show 
lower  income  in  countries  with  relatively  high  statutory  rates.  Holding 
other  policies  constant,  this  also  implies  a  negative  relation  between 
reported  retained earnings  and  the  difference between  the  U.S.  statutory 
rate  and  the  home  statutory  rate.  These  effects  should  be  stronger  for 
exemption countries compared to foreign tax credit countries. They should 
also depend only on current statutory tax rates, with no lagged effect as in 
the  case of  investment incentives. The  following proposition summarizes 
these incentives. 
6. Both  retained  earnings and  transfers  of  funds  should  be  negatively 
related to the current difference between the U.S. statutory corporate rate 
and the home country statutory corporate rate,  with the effect stronger for 
exemption countries. 
Tables  3.9-3.11  present  the  results  of  adding  four  variables  to  each 
country-specific regression equation: (i) the effective corporate-level tax rate 
on new  investment in the home country, including the current rate and two 
lags; and (ii) the difference between the U.S.  statutory corporate tax rate and 
the home country statutory corporate tax rate. Note that these tax rate series 
are not available for the Netherlands and that therefore regression results for 
only six countries are presented. 
The  results  do  not  provide  much  support  for  propositions  3-5. 
According  to  table  3.11,  in  no  exemption country is the home  country’s 
tax  rate  positively  related  to  FDI.  Table  3.10  reveals  that  the  effect  of 
home  country  taxation  on  transfers  is  not  obviously  more  negative  for 
foreign tax  credit  countries  compared to  exemption  countries.  Table  3.9 
does suggest that  retained earnings are, as proposed,  not usually  affected 
by  home  country  taxation  in  foreign  tax  credit  countries.  Proposition 6 
fares slightly better, with  a significant coefficient of  the expected negative 
sign on the difference in  statutory rates occurring for West  Germany and 
Italy  (for transfers of  funds  and  total  FDI)  and  no case  of  a  significant 
positive sign occurring. Note also that the estimated negative effect of  U.S. 
taxation  on  total  FDI  for West  Germany and  Japan  disappears when  the 
home  country tax  rates  are  included,  although a  negative effect  of  U.S. 
taxes  on Canadian investment appears when  it did  not  in  the  absence of 
home country tax rates. 
There are several possible explanations for the lack of a clear difference in 
the  tax  responsiveness  of  FDI  from  exemption  and  foreign  tax  credit 
countries. One is that the data are simply not good enough to pick up the 
differences in behavior that do in fact exist.  In particular, the effective tax 
rate  series  have  well-known  problems  as  accurate  measures  of  the 
disincentives to invest. Alternatively, it may be that the ability of firms from Table 3.9  Regression Equations Explaining Retained Earnings Using Home Country Tax Rates, by Investing Country 
~~~~~  ~~~~~~~ 
Country and Sample Period 
“Exemption”  Countries  Foreign Tax Credit Countries 
Canada,  France,  West Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  United Kingdom, 
Independent Variables  1965-86  1962-87  1962-87  1962-87  1972 -  87  1962-87 
7.  I 
7.2 
T 
T-  I 
T-  2 
,873 
(1  .00) 
-  .242 
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-  ,205 
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-  6.17 
,478 
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-  ,530 
(.402) 
-  .0263 
(.422) 
,00948 
(.  294) 
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Mean of dependent variable 
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-  ,021  1 
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(.833) 
-  ,0281 
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1.25 
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-  ,0191 
-  1.32 





-  .624 











-  ,427 
(.394) 
-  .m549 
(.oooO206) 
-  ,00150 
(.00160) 




-  .0704 
(.06  10) 
1.52 
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-  ,145 
,105 
-  .0274 
(.535) 










-  ,779 
( .254) 
,244 




Note: See notes to table 3.4. Table 3.10  Regression Equations Explaining Transfers of Funds Using Home Country Tax Data, by  Investing Country 
Country and Sample Period 
Independent Variables 
“Exemption”  Countries  Foreign Tax Credit Countries 
Canada,  France,  West Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  United Kingdom, 
1965 -  86  1962-87  1972-87  1962- 87  1962-87  1962-87 
-  1.70 
(I .70) 
-  ,170 
(1.48) 








-  1.42 
(1.05) 
.863 




-  ,0640 
(.639) 
-  ,816 
(  .866) 
-  ,520 






-  6.76 
(3.25) 










-  ,389 
(.208) 
,123 
(  .248) 
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(2.81) 
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7 + 7.1  + 7.2 
T + T.1  + T.2 
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~  ,0910 
(.0635) 
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(  .969) 
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(.537) 
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(1.30) 
1.96 
-  ,286 
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-  ,0108 
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(7.39) 
















.49  1 
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(3.49) 

















Note: See notes to table 3.4 Table 3.11  Regression Equations Explaining Total FDI Using Home Country Tax Data, by  Investing Country 
Country and Sample Period 
“Exemption”  Countries  Foreign Tax Credit Countries 
Japan,  United Kingdom,  Canada,  France,  West Germany,  Italy, 
Independent Variables  1965 -  86  1962- 87  1962- 87  1962-87  1972-87  1962-87 
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foreign tax credit countries to defer indefinitely home country taxation and to 
engage  in  sophisticated  financial  transactions  renders  insignificant  the 
effective rate of  home country taxation. If  the latter hypothesis is true, then 
the U.S. tax rate is the important source of  investment disincentives for all 
capital-importing  countries,  regardless  of  their  system  of  alleviating 
international double taxation. 
3.5  Conclusions 
This research was undertaken in order to shed light on the role of  both 
U.S. and investing country tax systems on FDI in the United States. Two 
distinct  approaches  were  attempted.  In  the  first,  the  standard  empirical 
model  relating  total  FDI  in  the  United  States  to  U.S.  taxation  was 
respecified  to  (i)  eliminate the  spurious bias  caused  by  relating  retained 
earnings to a measure of rate of return that  would be behaviorally related 
to retained earnings, (ii) use a measure of the marginal effective rate of tax 
on new  investment rather than  an  observed average or  statutory tax  rate, 
(iii) hold constant the influence of  nontax variables on  FDI,  and (iv) take 
account  of  the  data  collection  process,  which  introduces  increasing 
underestimation of  FDI  as the time elapsed from the previous benchmark 
survey  of  FDI  increases.  The  results  of  this  new  empirical  approach 
generally  support a negative effect of  U.S.  effective rates of  taxation  on 
total FDI  and  transfers of  funds,  but  not  on  retained earnings.  There is, 
however, at least one very  successful alternative explanation of  FDI in the 
United  States-that  it  is propelled by  stagnation in the home country, as 
measured by  its unemployment rate of prime-age males-that  precludes the 
association of  U.S. tax rates with FBI. 
In the second approach, 1 examined the time series of  FDI in the United 
States  disaggregated  by  the  seven  major  investing  countries.  This 
disaggregation allows a detailed examination of  the  effect on  FDI  in  the 
United States of  the rates of  home country taxation and the home country’s 
system  of  taxing  foreign-source  income  (i.e.,  exemption  vs.  worldwide 
taxation  with  a foreign tax  credit).  The results of  these  country analyses 
generally corroborate the aggregate analysis of  the effect of  U.S.  taxes on 
FDI. However, they do not generally support several propositions about the 
different tax  sensitivity of  FDI  from countries that  exempt foreign-source 
income from domestic taxation compared to  countries that tax  worldwide 
income  and  offer  a  foreign  tax  credit  to  mitigate  double  taxation.  The 
inability  to  support  these  propositions  may  be  due  to  the  difficulties in 
accurately measuring home country effective tax rates, or they may indicate 
that,  because  of  deferral  and  the  availability  of  sophisticated  financial 
strategies,  the  home  country  tax  rate  and  its  system  of  alleviating 
international double taxation is not an important determinant of FDI. 113  Tax  Effects on €31  in the U.S. 
Appendix 
Data Definitions and Sources 
1.  Foreign Direct Investment.  Taken from several issues of  the Survey  of 
Current Business. The most recent citation is August  1988: “Foreign Direct 
Investment in the United States: Detail for Position and Balance of Payment 
Flows,”  tables 12-19. 
2.  US.  Marginal  Effective  Corporate Tax Rates  (7).  Auerbach and Hines 
(1988, table 1, col.  1).  The 1987 tax rate is obtained by multiplying their 1986 
figure by the ratio of the post-tax-reform and pre-tax-reform effective tax rates 
on capital in Fullerton and Karayannis (1987, tables IV.5 and IV.6, col. 3). 
3. Foreign Marginal  Effective  Tar Rates (T).  For France,  Italy, the United 
Kingdom, and West Germany, these are calculated from separate series on 
the effective tax rate equipment and structures provided by  Julian Alworth. 
The overall effective tax rate is equal to 
[aEtE/(l -  tE) + asts/(l -  rs)]  / [aE/(l  -tE) + as/(l -  ts)], 
where  tE and  ts  are the  effective tax  rates  on  equipment and  structures, 
respectively, and aE  and as are the fraction of the capital stock in equipment 
and structures, respectively. This formula is taken from King and Fullerton 
(1984). The value of aE  is set to be 0.585 and a, to 0.415. This corresponds 
to the fraction of capital stock in equipment and structures, respectively, in 
manufacturing found by  King and Fullerton for both the United Kingdom 
and West Germany, the only two European countries they investigate. 
For Japan, the tax rate series is taken from Tajika and Yui (1988, table 3, 
col. 4). These calculations include the effect of personal taxes. However, the 
personal tax parameters are either small in magnitude (the capital gains tax is 
zero) or unimportant (the tax on dividends is presumed to affect only the cost 
of capital financed by new share issues, which constitutes only 3.6 percent of 
total finance). The values for 1985-87  are set equal to the 1984 rate. 
For Canada, the tax rate series up to  1981 is from Boadway, Bruce, and 
Mintz  (1987,  table  3.3, col.  10). Comparable values  for  1982-87  were 
provided by Jack Mintz. 
4.  U.S. and Foreign Statutory Corporate Tax Rates. U.S.  rate taken from 
Pechman (1987, table A-8). Foreign rates taken from same sources as above. 
U.S. rate is federal only. 
5. Relative  GDP  (RGDP). Up  to  1985,  real  GDP  for  each  country  is 
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by  the population. The real  GDP per  capita and  population  measures  are 
taken from the supplement in diskette to Summers and Heston (1988). Real 
GDP for 1986 for each country is calculated as the 1985 GDP calculated as 
above  multiplied  by  one  plus  the  rate  of  real  growth  as  reported  in  the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Main 
Economic Indicators ([October 19881, 37-41).  1987 real GDP is calculated 
in a similar manner. 
6.  U.S. Unemployment  Rate  (USUNEMP). U.S.  unemployment rate  for 
males twenty years and over taken from Economic Report  of  the President 
(1988, table B-39). 
7.  Foreign  Unemployment  Rate  (FUNEMP). For  each  country,  it  is  the 
unemployment rate for males ages twenty-five to fifty-four taken from the 
OECD’s Labour  Force  Statistics  ([  1966-861,  472-501;  and various back 
issues).  The overall foreign unemployment rate  is  a  weighted  average of 
these rates, using  1975 real GDPs as the weights. 
8. Real Exchange Rate  (REXC). For  each country, it is the product of  the 
nominal  exchange  rate  (foreign  currency/U.S.$)  and  the  ratio  of  GDP 
deflators (U.S. GDP deflatodforeign GDP deflator). 1987 nominal exchange 
rates taken from the OECD’s Main Economic  Indicators  ([October 19881, 
30). 1987 GDP deflators are calculated using the percentage change in GDP 
deflators from  1986 to  1987 in the OECD’s Quarterly National  Accounts 
(first  quarter  1988).  The  1987  GDP  deflator  for  the  Netherlands  was 
calculated using the percentage change in the CPI from the OECD’s Main 
Economic Indicators ([October 19881, 140). GDP deflators up to  1986 are 
from the  OECD’s National  Accounts, Main Aggregates  ([  1960-861,  chart 
31, pp.  138-39).  Nominal exchange rates up  to  1986 are taken  from the 
same source (chart 2, pp.  150-51). 
The overall real exchange rate is calculated by  setting real exchange rates 
in  1975 levels  to  one  and  then  weighting  the  change  from  1975  real 
exchange rate levels by their respective shares of  real GDP in 1975. 
Notes 
1. Hartman  argues  that,  because  the  variable  measuring  the  rate  of  return  to 
domestic capital  is based  on replacement costs,  it will not capture  these  valuation 
effects. 
2.  Newlon  also  estimates  variants  of  Hartman’s  original  model  with  several 
additional  variables,  including  a  quadratic  time  trend,  dummy  variables  for  the 
years  when  data  revisions  were  made,  and  a  definition  of  the  return  to  direct 115  Tax Effects on FDI in the U.S 
investment  that  includes  the  fees and  royalties  that  accrue  to the  parent  from  its 
foreign  subsidiary.  Most  of  these  changes  do  not  alter  the  qualitative  results 
reported earlier. 
3. If, however, the home country’s tax system is expected to change, then there is 
an incentive to time repatriations appropriately. 
4. The  seven  countries,  whose  direct  investment  in  the  United  States  will  be 
analyzed in more detail below, are Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and West Germany. 
5. There are several reasons for the striking differences between Hartman’s results 
and the results reported  in the first column of  tables 3.1 and 3.2.  First, all the data 
have been  corrected  and updated.  That procedure  itself  renders  the  coefficient on 
r’(  1 - t)  in the retained earnings equation to be insignificantly different from zero. 
Second, Hartman  deals with the presence of  a negative retained earnings value by 
adding a positive constant to the numerator of  the dependent variable.  Because the 
denominator (GNP) is growing with time, this is tantamount to adding a gradually 
declining value.  Following Newlon, I add a constant to the left-hand-side variable 
before taking the logarithm. This reduces the absolute value of most coefficients and 
renders r’(1 - t)  insignificant in  the transfers equation. Finally, the regressions of 
tables 3.1 and  3.2 extend the  sample period back from  1965 to  1956 and forward 
from 1979 to 1984. The latter eliminates the significance of  r(1 - t) in the transfer 
equation and the combination of the two renders (1 - t’)/  (1 - t)  insignificant in 
both equations. 
6.  As Hartman  (1984) notes, no separate estimate of  the pretax rate of  return to 
FDl is available. The value used for r is obtained by assuming that the average rate of 
corporate and property tax faced by foreigners in the United States (t)  is the same as 
that faced by U.S. residents and solving for r using the known value of r(l - t). 
7. The conclusion does not depend on the log-linear specification. A linear version 
of  these regressions yields the same conclusion. 
8.  The tax elasticity is equal to P[(j  +  k)/y],  where 0 is the estimated tax rate 
coefficient, j  is the  average ratio  of  transfers  to  U.S. GNP,  and k  is the  constant 
added to this ratio before taking the logarithm. 
9.  See the data appendix for the definition and source of  all the variables used in 
the analyses. 
10. Other potential influences on FDI, for which I was unable to obtain reasonable 
indices, include the extent of current and expected U.S. tariff and nontariff barriers to 
imports and  the degree  of  quantitative  restrictions,  such as exchange controls,  on 
outward FDI. 
11. Of  course  this  argument  also  applies  to  the  other  influences  on  FDI.  One 
promising direction for future work is the investigation of more general lag structures. 
12.  It has been argued that the strong dollar of the early 1980s was in part caused 
by tax incentives given to investment at that time. This suggests that an instrumental 
variables estimation technique may be appropriate. 
13. Because of  data availability, the  sample period for this regression  begins in 
1969 rather than  1960. This is not, however, the source of  the difference in results 
because a version of  the regression without FUNEMP that begins in  1969 also shows 
a significant negative tax effect. 
14. Another  variable  whose  inclusion  eliminates  the  tax  effect  is  the  dummy 
variable for the post-1974 era, justified above because the BEA definition of FDI was 
changed in 1974. Apparently, much of the estimated tax effect reflects the simple fact 
that the post-1974 era is characterized  by  high FDI and low taxes, relative  to the 
pre- 1974 era. 
15. In fact, the sum of the tax coefficients has a positive sign that is significantly 
different from zero. 116  Joel Slemrod 
16.  I also experimented  with  the  method  of  seemingly  unrelated  regressions  to 
estimate the seven equations as a system.  Because the results were very  similar to 
those obtained using OLS, they are not reported here. 
17. By  statute,  Canada  and  West  Germany  operate  foreign  tax  credit  systems. 
However,  both  countries  exempt  from  domestic  taxation  business-related  income 
earned within the borders of its treaty partners, including the United States. 
18. The home country effective tax rates technically apply to domestically located 
investment. If the tax law discriminates investment by  location (as the U.S. tax law 
does), then the series on effective tax rates may not accurately capture the tax law’s 
effect  on  foreign-source  income.  For  example,  French  and  Japanese  corporations 
engaged  in  foreign  investment  are entitled  to deduct  from  taxable  income certain 
special  reserves.  Other  details  of  the  home  country’s  tax  system  may  also  be 
important,  particularly  the  degree of  corporate  and  personal  tax  integration.  For 
example, although by treaty dividends from U.S. subsidiaries to West German parent 
corporations  are  untaxed  by  the  West  German  government,  if  and  when  exempt 
foreign-source  income  is  distributed  to  shareholders  by  the  parent,  it  is  taxed 
differently than dividends from earnings on domestic-source income. 
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Comment  David G.  Hartman 
As Joel Slemrod points out, recent empirical work on foreign direct investment 
has been narrowly focused, making subtle changes to aggregate annual re- 
gressions. It is a reflection of  the dearth of  information, certainly not the 
elegance of  the empirical work in Hartman (1984), that succeeding research 
has been so single tracked. With so many similar exercises now reported, the 
question that has to arise is whether a small and suspect information base has 
been used and reused beyond the limits of statistical validity. 
In  this paper,  Slemrod pursues  “two  distinct approaches”  for enhancing 
our knowledge of  tax effects on foreign investment. It is his second approach 
that breaks with tradition, by  looking at investment in the United States by 
home country, and truly advances the level of  debate, it is to be hoped for 
good. But, first, Slemrod goes back over some familiar territory, extending 
and updating the standard model in several ways. 
David  G. Hartman  is  Group  Vice  President  and  Chief  International  Economist  with 
DRUMcGraw-Hill and a research affiliate of the National Bureau of  Economic Research. 118  Joel Slemrod 
His first objective is to eliminate the spurious correlation between retained 
earnings  investment  and  the  rate  of  return,  which  could  result  from  the 
inclusion of retained earnings as part of the total return calculation. He tests 
for  possible  bias  by  estimating  separate  coefficients  for  taxes,  ln(t),  and 
gross rates of return, ln(r), finding that the tax effect is not confirmed. 
With less than half of earnings typically reinvested in aggregate (and with 
reinvestment  ratios quite  variable),  it is not generally  true that  investment 
exhausted  earnings,  creating  an  artificial  rather  than  behavioral  relation 
between rate of return  and investment.  Nevertheless,  doubts should at least 
be raised  about spurious correlation due to measurement errors in earnings. 
So I concur completely with Slemrod’s emphasis on the problem, which  I 
highlighted  in my original paper and in my comments on Boskin and Gale. 
But I wish he had followed my procedure of separating of ln[r(l -  t)]  into 
ln(r) and  ln(1 -  t), which  had  strongly  confirmed  the  coefficient  of  the 
combination variable (using then-available  data, over a shorter interval). As 
it stands, we cannot tell  if  Slemrod’s results  differ because  of  the  shift in 
functional form or because the relation I identified was not robust across data 
revisions and time intervals. With the surge in international investment in the 
1980s, and particularly  in highly leveraged corporate acquisitions,  it would 
be unremarkable if previous relations no longer held. 
Another disturbing aspect of  Slemrod’s proposed remedy is that it does not 
really address the problem.  By all logic,  the spurious correlation would exist 
between retained earnings and the after-tax return, r(l -  t),  so testing whether 
t matters on its own cannot distinguish between a spurious and a causal relation. 
Two  procedures  that  might  help  were  pursued  in  my  1984 paper:  to 
instrument r(1 - t) by its value lagged a year and to see if there is a rate of 
return  effect  on  the  dividend  payout  ratio  (which,  of  course,  has  the 
offending earnings figure in both numerator and denominator). 
Slemrod’s  second  objective  is  to  replace  average  tax  rate  measures  by 
marginal  rate  measures.  The  reader  tends  to  accept  without  question  a 
statement  that  marginal  rates  are  better,  but  in  this  case  I  am  not  sure. 
Probably more often than not, the direct investment decision of the 1980s is 
whether to buy a U.S. company, or at least whether to buy an existing U.S. 
plant, in which case the average tax rate could well be more relevant.’  Even 
leaving  acquisitions  aside, foreign  direct  investment  is  far less likely  than 
domestic investment to be “purely  marginal”  since it will frequently involve 
the  development  of  an entire  operation  rather  than  an  addition  to  capital 
alone.  All that having been  said, the use of the Auerbach-Hines  tax terms 
confirms the previous conclusions. 
Finally,  Slemrod  seeks to confirm prior results  by including a variety  of 
alternative  explanatory  variables.  While  one  can  always  criticize  such 
efforts, I think we too scldom employ eclectic tests of  robustness. 
What does concern me is that, from this point on, Slemrod abandons the 
model of foreign investment as a function of rates of return. Once again, the 119  Tax Effects on FDI in the U.S. 
potential for spurious correlation between investment and the rate of return is 
Slemrod’s concern,  but  it  is far  from clear  what  theory  of  investment is 
implied  by  a  specification that  keeps  only  the  tax  rate  and  then  adds 
alternative variables. For instance, a model could be advanced to relate the 
relative growth rates of GNP to investment. But the results from table 3.4 
are based on equations including levels of GNP. 
Of  even  more  concern  than  the  lack  of  a  well-specified  model  is  the 
possibility that the tax rate itself might be cyclically sensitive. If  so, the tax 
parameter could tend to proxy for the gross rate of return to investment, and 
all interpretations of  its coefficient would be suspect. 
In general, annual time-series analysis puts a premium on testing clean 
and parsimonious alternative specifications. Adding variables without clear 
theoretical justification can test robustness,  but  annual time  series are so 
highly  correlated that  some added  variable is  almost bound  to reduce the 
significance of  the tax effect. 
So I am not as disturbed as Slemrod that a foreign unemployment variable 
is highly (positively) related to direct investment in the United States to the 
extent of  reversing estimated tax  effects.  As  far  as we  can tell from the 
paper, the result emerges only in equations without rate of return variables. 
If  unemployment is serving as a proxy for the return  to  investment, it is 
probably a poor one. Could it serve as a proxy for the after-tax return just as 
well as a proxy for the gross return? If  so, the lack of  an independent tax 
effect is not disturbing. On the other hand, unemployment as a measure of 
labor market  conditions and  not  a  proxy  for  general  business conditions 
would surely have the opposite sign. So I would not be quick to conclude 
that this is  an  “alternative  explanation.”  It may  simply be  that too many 
experiments are being conducted on the limited and crude information base 
available. 
I find Slemrod’s other additions more significant. His result that the dollar 
matters is  new,  interesting,  and  plausible.  The attempt to  correct for the 
nonlinkage of  data  around benchmark  survey years  is  even more useful. 
Indeed, I found the fact that inclusion of a dummy variable for the post-1974 
era eliminates the tax effect to be the most interesting result of the first half 
of  the paper2 The discussion,  relegated to  a  note,  is  certainly  sobering. 
Nonetheless,  I  believe  that  Slemrod’s conclusion  that  the  estimated  tax 
effects  are  arising  solely  from  the  recent  investment  surge in  a  low-tax 
environment is too harsh. Significant results such as those in my  1984 paper 
were produced in a period before both phenomena. 
The  test  of  any  extension  of  similar  work  is  what  conclusions  were 
supported or rejected.  Slemrod generally finds tax  effects that  seem fairly 
robust, but he finds them in direct investment by  funds transfers and not in 
retained earnings investment. These results are interesting in reversing many 
of  the  prior  conclusions,  while  supporting  others.  Slemrod  has  taken 
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prior work,  a procedure that  is all too seldom followed in this  field. The 
conclusions here are, thus, highly useful, particularly in pointing out where 
earlier results were not robust. 
When Slernrod turns to the disaggregation by  home country, he uses the 
formulation that  includes the  “other  explanatory  variables”  but  not  any 
gross  rate  of  return  measures.  My  previous  comments thus  apply to  the 
remainder of the paper. 
That said, I think that this effort is headed in a very positive direction and 
that Slemrod is in many cases too tough on himself, in that he presented a 
difficult set of propositions for testing. 
For  example,  he  first looks  at  U.S.  tax  effects  on foreign  investment, 
hoping  to  see  distinctions  in  the  responsiveness  of  investment  from 
“exemption  countries”  and  “tax  credit countries.”  All  the tax  effects on 
direct investment involving transfers of  funds are of  the correct sign,  and 
four of  seven are significant. Despite the fact that there is not an obvious 
pattern  of  greater  significance in  “exemption  countries,”  and  despite the 
perverse  results  for  retained  earnings  investment,  I  find  these  results 
encouraging. There are a variety of  reasons for expecting a lack of  sharp 
results in the disaggregation by home country. 
One problem  is  simply the  identity of  the  home  country.  As  Slemrod 
points out, the 1974 benchmark shifted from a definition that included some 
“ultimate  beneficial  owners”  to  a  consistent  “first  foreign  entity  in  the 
ownership chain”  standard. That definitional change produced a break  in 
each  time  series,  sometimes  with  large  consequences  for  the  country 
identification  of  investors.  Furthermore,  it  highlighted  the  difficulty  of 
defining the national identity of  and relating to national tax parameters the 
behavior of entities that are fundamentally global. 
Disaggregation also emphasizes the effect of singular events in the data. 
For  instance, one of  the more striking patterns is  that of  Japan,  shown in 
figure 3.7b. The extreme 1971 Japanese retreat from the United States was 
entirely accounted for by a $487 million disinvestment by “other industries” 
after a history of  investment never exceeding double digits.  This episode, 
which has all the earmarks of  a single large transaction, is far from unusual 
in the foreign investment data. These events merely contribute to a pattern in 
the  aggregate  data  but  can  easily  overwhelm  all  else  in  disaggregated 
analysis. Especially in an era of  large acquisitions, we are faced with very 
“noisy”  disaggregated data. 
A related point is that the industry composition of  investment varies by 
country.  In  estimating  tax  effects,  it  is  critical  that  the  relevant  tax 
parameters be identified. But, if various NBER tax projects have taught one 
lesson above all, it is that the variation in effective tax rates across industries 
may overwhelm the variations through time or across countries. Investments 
involving the countries analyzed by  Slemrod certainly have very different 
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led with 35 percent, followed by  trade (18 percent), petroleum (14 percent), 
and real estate (9 percent). Japan, by  contrast, had nearly three-quarters of 
its U.S. investment in the trade sector as recently as 1983. The recent surge 
in real estate raised its share to 13 percent in 1987, with trade falling to less 
than  half.  While  only about  16 percent of  Japan’s investment is  in  U.S. 
manufacturing,  that  sector  accounts  for  about  90  percent  of  France’s 
investment. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom are far more focused 
on petroleum  investments than  the  average. In  general,  average U.S.  tax 
rates would be expected to have varying degrees of relevance to investments 
by different countries. This is particularly true in light of the special U.S. tax 
treatment of real estate and petroleum. 
In summary, the data by country are very noisy; also, it is hard to identify 
the  relevant  “home”  country;  and,  even  then,  the  extent  to  which  the 
measured tax rates are relevant varies. For these reasons, it is no surprise that 
the strength of  estimated tax  effects cannot easily be related  to the  home 
country’s treatment of foreign-source income. To  me, the real surprise is the 
success in identifying consistent U.S. tax effects on investment by  transfer 
of  funds. 
Slemrod then  goes  on  explicitly to  include measures of  home  country 
taxes; there is little confirmation of the hypotheses he wants to test. Again, 
the lack of significance could have been anticipated. Still relevant here are all 
the concerns about the singular events that dominate the data, the national 
identity of  firms, and the industry composition of investment (the relevance 
of the measured tax rates is questionable for both the United States and the 
host country this time).  A related issue is the standard against which U.S. 
investments are judged by  a global firm. The relevant tax comparison for a 
U.K.  subsidiary of  a Dutch firm thinking of  investing in the United States 
might  be  between Canada  and  the  United  States  (rather than  the  United 
Kingdom and the United States as measured here). Obviously, the situations 
can be  highly  complex, but the number of  parameters estimated here has 
already exceeded what one can probably expect from the data. 
Perhaps most  important,  the  sign of  the home country tax  parameter is 
indeterminate from economic theory. Under a foreign tax credit system, as 
Slemrod points out, higher home country taxes tend to favor U.S. investment 
over home country investment but tend to discourage both. But, even in the 
case of  an exemption system, the case is far from clear. Recent investment 
research has established a theoretical role for internal cash flow, legitimizing 
what  have  long  been  highly  robust  empirical  models.  In  such  a  model, 
foreign investment would be negatively affected by even those home country 
taxes that do not directly apply to operations abroad. Not only is the sign of 
the  tax  effect  indeterminate,  but  it  depends  in  part  on  each  country’s 
financial structure and on the “average firm’s’’ situation. 
So,  for  a  wide  variety  of  theoretical  and  practical  reasons,  it  is  not 
surprising that a crisp set of conclusions about home country tax effects fails 122  Joel Slernrod 
to emerge. It is probably  enough that the U.S. tax effects identified earlier 
generally hold up in the presence of home country tax parameters. 
Like most prepared  conference comments, these  accentuate  the negative 
and  are more critical  than  my overall opinion of  Slernrod’s efforts. He is 
moving  this  area  of  research  in  a  very  positive  direction,  despite  the 
monumental data problems that he has confronted. There is still much to be 
done-I  think, for example, that there is hope for analysis  by  industry  by 
country, despite the data being even noisier. In any case, researching foreign 
investment and especially the effects of tax policy is a dirty job (not for the 
purist),  but  I hope that Slemrod and others keep doing it. 
Notes 
1.  Survey of Current Business reports (e.g., May  1988, 50-58)  imply that annual 
U.S. acquisitions have  typically been  between 50 and  100 percent  as large as  total 
direct  investment  in  the  1980s.  The  figures  are  not  directly  comparable  since 
acquisitions financed by  U.S.  debt would not count as direct investment. 
2. The  dummy  variable  reflects  the  new  benchmark  and  associated  definitional 
changes in the calculation of  direct investment. As Commerce noted in comparing the 
1974 figures under both definitions, the changes were very significant. Under the new 
definitions, the  1974 direct investment  stock  was  21  percent  higher,  while  direct 
investment income was 29 percent lower 